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Fast gated avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are the most commonly used single photon detectors for
high bit rate quantum key distribution (QKD). Their robustness against external attacks is crucial
to the overall security of a QKD system or even an entire QKD network. Here, we investigate
the behavior of a gigahertz-gated, self-differencing InGaAs APD under strong illumination, a tactic
Eve often uses to bring detectors under her control. Our experiment and modelling reveal that the
negative feedback by the photocurrent safeguards the detector from being blinded through reducing
its avalanche probability and/or strengthening the capacitive response. Based on this finding, we
propose a set of best-practice criteria for designing and operating fast-gated APD detectors to ensure
their practical security in QKD.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of se-
cure communication whose security is guaranteed by the
laws of physics and does not depend on any assumption
of an eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) computational power [1, 2].
In its implementation, semiconductor avalanche photodi-
odes (APDs) are the most used single photon detectors
because they can operate at temperatures obtainable by
thermo-electric cooling, or even room temperature [3, 4].
For this reason, they have naturally attracted intensive
scrutiny in the QKD community [5]. The blinding attack,
in particular, has been demonstrated to be the most effec-
tive. Here, Eve first shines bright light onto the receiver’s
detectors, which brings them under her control [6–8], and
then uses a faked state attack in an intercept and resend
configuration, which ensures that the receiver’s detectors
click only when he chooses the same basis as hers [9].
Under a favourable setting [10], Eve can gain all infor-
mation on the final key without introducing a quantum
bit error.
With advances in fast gating techniques [11–17], APD
detectors can count single photons at gigahertz rates [18]
and their importance in QKD has grown considerably
[19–23]. Gigahertz-clocked self-differencing (SD) detec-
tors have enabled a secure key rate exceeding 10 Mb/s
[24] and can support a communication distance over
200 km of fiber [25] , while their robustness for real-world
deployment has been routinely proven in field trials [26–
28]. However, little scrutiny has so far been devoted to
the security of these fast-gated detectors, except a recent
study on a moderate-speed SD detector [29]. There still
lacks a set of best-practice criteria for designing and op-
erating these detectors, although an incorrectly designed
or ill-set detector will be guaranteed to bring vulnerabil-
ity into a QKD system [30].
All fast gating techniques use high frequency gating
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to periodically switch on the detector for single photon
detection, although they may differ in how the signal is
processed after optical detection, i.e., how the strong ca-
pacitive response to the fast gating signal is removed.
Here, we investigate the behavior of a gigahertz gated
SD detector under strong illumination to gain insights
into the behavior of fast-gated detectors. While an ap-
propriately set detector shows resilience against blinding
attacks, we explore the detector parameter space where
the device becomes prone to blinding. Our analysis re-
veals that the negative feedback by the photocurrent of
a properly set SD-APD prevents the detector from being
blinded and this conclusion is further supported by the-
oretical modelling. The feedback reduces the avalanche
probability and increases the detector capacitance, with
a combined effect that safeguards the detector from the
blinding attacks. Our findings enable us to propose a set
of best-practice criteria for designing and operating these
detectors to ensure their practical security in QKD.
The device under test is a fiber-coupled InGaAs/InP
APD which is thermo-electrically cooled to -30 ○C and
has a breakdown voltage of 51.8 V. Generic electronics in
the form of a DC voltage source and pulse generator are
used to provide the SD-APD with a constant DC bias of
51.6 V and a 1 GHz square wave with a peak-to-peak am-
plitude of 4.6 V, respectively. This bias condition results
in an excess voltage of V 0ex = 2.1 V over its breakdown
voltage. The series resistance of the APD is measured
to be 1.0 kΩ. A variable quenching or biasing resistor is
applied in the biasing circuit for later convenience and
its initial value is set to zero. A continuous wave DFB
C-band laser was used to illuminate the APD and the
output was amplified by two 20 dB amplifiers before be-
ing measured using a 16 GHz oscilloscope. The overall
experimental set-up is given in Fig. 1(a).
Under fast gating, an APD produces a strong ca-
pacitive response which can be much stronger than the
avalanche signals arising from photon detections. To sup-
press such a response and enable photon detection, the
2FIG. 1. (a) Setup for characterising the self-differencing de-
tector under bright illuminations. LD: laser diode; VOA:
variable optical attenuator; SD: self-differencer; Rq: quench-
ing resistor. (b) An SD output waveform showing a single
avalanche rising above the capacitive response residual. (c)
Detection efficiency and dark count rate as a function of the
discrimination level. 18 mV is marked as our chosen appro-
priate discrimination level.
SD circuit splits the output of the APD in half, shifting
one of those halves by a gating period and then recombin-
ing the two halves in order to cancel the strong capacitive
response of the detector [12]. Fig. 1(b) shows a typical
waveform of an SD output, with an avalanche signal ris-
ing above the residual, uncancelled background of the de-
tector capacitive response. It is important to choose an
appropriate discrimination level that rejects the residual
capacitive background while accepting photon-induced
avalanches with a maximal probability. Figure 1(c) shows
the detector efficiency and dark count rate as a function
of the discrimination level. The dark count rate shows a
kink at the discrimination level of 16 mV, indicating the
threshold above which the dark avalanches have replaced
the capacitive residuals to be the dominant contribution
to the measured dark count rate. While we could use this
level, we set the discrimination level about 10% higher at
18 mV in order to have a tolerance margin. The detector
is measured to have a single photon detection efficiency
of 26% for pulsed light and a dark count rate of ∼23 kHz
for this discrimination level. Setting a higher discrimina-
tion leads to a lower detection efficiency and dark count
rate. More detrimentally, this can also favour blinding,
as we will show later, and therefore goes against the best
FIG. 2. Detector count rates as a function of incident optical
power from a continuous-wave C-band laser diode with differ-
ent discrimination levels. The variable quenching resistor is
set to 0 Ω. The dashed line represents Eq. 1 with a constant
η = 0.028 for continuous-wave illumination.
practice of using SD-APDs.
Gated APDs are often simplified as a binary detec-
tor, i.e., their avalanche amplitude is independent of the
number of photons that triggered it [31]. Under such a
simplification, an SD detector’s count rate (fC) can be
written as
fC = f(1 − Pclick)Pclick = fe−µη(1 − e−µη), (1)
where Pclick is the probability of an avalanche being gen-
erated, f is the gating frequency, µ is the photon flux
per gate and η is the probability that a photon initiates
a macroscopic avalanche.
Equation (1) highlights the nature of the self-
differencing circuit which requires an avalanche to be
followed by no avalanche in order to be registered as a
count. If two subsequent counts occur, then the cancel-
lation effect will cause one of them not to be counted.
If Pclick = 1, then every gate contains an avalanche and
they all cancel each other out, resulting in a count rate of
zero. Therefore, under blinding conditions, we expect a
count rate of zero when µη ≫ 1, translating to a blinding
power of ∼100 nW for the current detector under con-
tinuous wave excitation, see Fig. 2 (dashed line). This
blinding power is 3–4 orders magnitude lower than that
required for conventional gated APDs [6], and this has
lead to concern that such intrinsic imperfection threat-
ens the security of a high bit rate QKD system using SD
detectors [29].
To examine this prediction, we subject our detector to
continuous-wave illumination from the laser diode. Fig. 2
shows the detector count rate as a function of the incident
optical power for various discrimination levels. We first
look at the result obtained with the appropriate discrim-
ination level of 18 mV. In the weak illumination regime
(≤10 nW), the detector behaves like a typical single pho-
ton detector. Its count rate is initially dominated by
3FIG. 3. Detector behavior with different quenching resistor
values. (a) Detector count rates as a function of the incident
optical power at an ill-set discrimination level of 26 mV; (b)
Measured photocurrents and calculated voltage drop in the
detector bias. The same color codes are used in (a) and (b)
to represent different quenching resistor values.
dark count noise, then increases linearly due to detection
of incoming photons before saturation at about 4 nW.
Beyond saturation, the detector exhibits a count rate
plateau between 10 nW to 2 µW while Eq. 1 predicts
an immediate, sharp drop in the count rate. When the
optical power is greater than 2 µW, the count rate starts
to fall noticeably because of the SD cancellation between
neighbouring gates. However, the fall only creates a shal-
low dip with a local minimum of 21.4 MHz at ∼ 0.23 mW.
We do not observe detector blinding, i.e., the count rate
falling to zero for the incident power up to 7 mW.
By increasing the discrimination level, both the detec-
tion efficiency and saturation count rate become lower,
as a higher discrimination level rejects a larger fraction
of self-differenced signals. More strikingly, the count rate
dip becomes deeper. At 26 mV, the detector registers a
zero count rate with an incident power between 0.1 and
2.5 mW. The existence of this blinding gap makes Eve’s
blinding attack feasible, and this leads to an unsurpris-
ing conclusion that an inappropriately-set SD detector is
vulnerable, just like its low speed counterparts [30]. We
note that the minimum blinding power is still more than
three orders of magnitude larger than that predicted by
Eq.(1).
To understand the origin of the discrepancy, we per-
form another experiment by varying the resistance value
of the quenching resistor in the DC path of the detec-
tor biasing circuit. While use of a quenching resistor is
common for free-running APD detectors [32], it is un-
necessary for gated APDs because an avalanche is au-
tomatically quenched after a detection gate. Figure 3(a)
shows the count rate dependencies for different resistance
values together with that obtained without a quenching
resistor. Here, we choose to use the ill-set discrimination
level of 26 mV to enhance the blinding effect. A blind-
ing gap exists for all resistance values, but the gap shifts
to lower power regions as the resistance value increases.
With 400 kΩ, the blinding power is just 100 nW, which
is three orders of magnitude lower than the 0 kΩ case.
Figure 3(b) shows the measured detector photocur-
rent (dashed lines) as a function of the incident opti-
cal power. Flowing through the resistive components,
including both the quenching resistor and the APD it-
self, the photocurrent creates a voltage drop and there-
fore lowers the detector reverse bias, see Fig. 3(b) (solid
lines). This has two direct effects. First, it reduces the
avalanche probability (η). The higher the incident power,
the lower the excess bias and avalanche probability. This
explains why the detector requires a much higher optical
power to become blinded than that expected from Eq.(1)
and the formation of the count rate plateau. Second, it
lowers the avalanche signal amplitude and consequently
the differential signal between adjacent detector gates. A
larger quenching resistor makes the detector excess bias
drop faster, as shown in the following equation
Vex = V 0ex − I ⋅R, (2)
where V 0ex is the excess bias under dark conditions, I is
the photocurrent and R is the total series resistance, in-
cluding both the intentional quenching resistor and the
internal series resistance of the detector. The larger the
value of R, the smaller the required photocurrent to re-
duce the excess bias, Vex, to zero, which results in an ear-
lier blinding. The voltage drop corresponding to blinding
is marked in Fig. 3(b) with empty squares.
A third effect caused by the photocurrent can explain
the count rate recoveries shown in Fig. 3(a). We mark in
the figure the voltage values corresponding to the recov-
ery point after each blinding gap with an empty circle.
The voltage drop values are all around 5 V. This observa-
tion provides a key to understanding the count rate recov-
eries, as we explain here. A SD circuit suppresses the de-
tector capacitive response but will always leave a residual
background due to its finite performance. The amplitude
of such background is proportional to the APD capaci-
tance, see Fig. 1(b), which depends on the thickness of
its depletion layer that is reverse-bias dependent [33]. A
voltage drop leads to an increase in the capacitance and
hence the amplitude of the residual background, which
will eventually overcome the discrimination level and re-
vive the counting rate. This explanation agrees with the
count rate reaching 1 GHz for all quenching resistor val-
ues, see Fig. 3(a).
To provide further support to this argument, we mea-
sure the APD capacitive amplitude under dark conditions
before the SD circuit as we reduce the DC bias applied
to the device. As shown in Fig. 4, we find that at the
point of recovery, the response has increased in ampli-
tude by 25% of its original value where there is a bias
reduction of 4.5 V. This quantity of bias reduction can
be realised using 2.3 mW of optical illumination for the
4FIG. 4. APD capacitive response measured before the self-
differencing circuit as a function of the DC bias reduction
below its normal value. We mark the point corresponding to
the count rate recovery as shown in Fig. 3.
case of the biasing resistor being set at zero. Due to the
imperfect cancellation of the SD, the increased capaci-
tance of the APD translates to a larger background after
the SD circuit. This measurement result also justifies
our choice of the appropriate discrimination level being
only 10% above the capacitive background (see our pre-
vious discussion), as this can easily be overcome by such
a dramatic increase in the residual capacitive signal. We
note that the measured increase of the capacitive signal
is applicable to all fast-gated APDs [11–17]
With both sides of each blinding gap accounted for,
it is natural to understand the gradual disappearance of
the blinding gap when lowering the discrimination level
(Fig. 2). In a “blinding” gap, the SD output signal is
made up of two components with opposing trends. The
differential output of the SD circuit becomes smaller as
the incident power increases, because each detector gate
is more likely to produce an avalanche with a saturated
amplitude or the amplitude itself is reduced by the low-
ered excess bias. Concurrently, the residual capacitive
background gains strength due to the reduction of the
APD reverse bias. The latter can overcome an appropri-
ately set discrimination level before the photon-induced
signal falls completely under.
The above explanation is distinctively different from
gain modulation that has prevented conventional gated
APDs from blinding [30]. Although still present, the
modulation of the photocurrent by detector gating is
periodical and considerably weaker than the capaci-
tive response and therefore its contribution to the self-
differencer output is negligible. Laser intensity fluctua-
tions can also produce self-differencing signals that can
overcome a detector discrimination level at high illumina-
tion power, in particular when pulsed optical excitation
is used [29]. However, this mechanism does not play the
dominant role in our case using continuous-wave illumi-
nation. First, it is incompatible with our observation in
Fig. 3 that the recovery power can vary over three orders
FIG. 5. Monte-Carlo simulation results (solid lines) of the de-
tector count rate as a function of incident optical power with
different discrimination levels. Experimental data for a 26 mV
discrimination level is shown for comparison. The dashed line
shows the expected count rate for a binary detector, i.e., an
APD with a constant avalanche probability and an avalanche
amplitude that is photon-number independent. Parameters:
Vex = 2.1 V, RAPD = 1 kΩ. σ0SD = 0.64, and η(0) = 0.028. The
discrimination levels shown in the figure and σSD are in units
of I0, which is the average current of single-photon induced
avalanches in the absence of a noticeable photocurrent.
of magnitude for the same detector and blinding laser,
with the lowest recovery power being merely 2 µW. Sec-
ond, the intensity fluctuation should produce a maximum
count rate that is half of the gating frequency, while we
observed a maximum count rate of 1 GHz.
We perform a Monte-Carlo simulation to reproduce the
experimental observation shown in Fig. 2. For each APD
gate, we compute its avalanche current (i1, i2, i3, ...) and
then determine the current difference between neighbour-
ing gates (∆n = in − in−1). Together with the capacitive
residual background (σSD), this differential current rep-
resents the self-differencing output and we compare the
value of ∆n + σSD against the discrimination level (δ)
to decide whether a gate produces a count. In the sim-
ulation, we take into account the negative feedback of
the photocurrent. This lowers the avalanche probability
which is related to the excess voltage described in Eq.(2).
This reduced excess bias increases the capacitive resid-
ual σSD which is a result of the reduction of the APD’s
charge layer depletion. The photon-number-dependent
[34] avalanche amplitude that is saturated at a high pho-
ton number is also accounted for.
Figure 5 shows the Monte-Carlo simulation results us-
ing the above model and a typical set of parameters (see
caption), with the exception of various discrimination
levels. For comparison, we re-plot the experimental data
(symbols) showing a blinding gap and obtained with a
26 mV discrimination level as well as the analytical cal-
culation (dashed line) for a binary detector using Eq. 1
with a constant η. We are able to see that the Monte-
5Carlo simulation has successfully reproduced the experi-
mental observations. Firstly, the simulation confirms the
detector blinding at a high discrimination level and the
subsequent count recovery due to the increased capaci-
tive response. Secondly, it replicates the blinding power
being three orders of magnitude higher than expected for
the binary detector. Finally, the blinding gap disappears
with lower discrimination levels and the count rate dip
becomes shallower. Although the simulation is based on
a simple and intuitive model, it confirms again the effects
of negative feedback on the detector photocurrent.
Having understood the effect of the negative feedback
of the photocurrent, we can reliably discuss the impact of
Eve’s blinding attacks on self-differencing detectors. To
succeed in blinding attacks, Eve has to blind all single
photon detectors in a system, i.e., each of them register-
ing zero or finite count rates that are negligible when
compared with that expected by the legitimate QKD
users. To keep hidden, her attack must not introduce
detectable changes. It is fair to say that an Eve using
the same equipment as we used, i.e., a continuous-wave
laser at 1606 nm with 1 GHz-clocked semiconductor SD-
APDs, achieves neither when SD detectors are appropri-
ately set. As shown in Fig. 2, Eve’s attack laser would
produce a count rate exceeding 10 MC/s, comparable
to the state-of-the-art raw key rates. At the same time,
Eve’s attack would produce a detectable photocurrent on
the order of 1 mA, thereby underlining that correctly set
SD detectors are resilient to a certain type of blinding
attack:
We propose below a list of best-practice criteria to be
followed in either designing or operating self-differencing
detectors to mitigate blinding attacks.
 Monitor the photocurrent. The blinding current
is still on the order of 1 mA, which can easily be
sensed using a resistor of 1 kΩ.
 Avoid use of a quenching or biasing resistor of
high resistance value, because it can provide overly
strong feedback to the excess bias and therefore
severely limit the maximum count rate. We rec-
ommend a value less than 50 kΩ when a biasing
resistor is desired to limit the current for protect-
ing the APD detector. This resistance value will
still allow a maximum count rate of over 30 MC/s
and have a negligible effect on the QKD key rate.
 Set an appropriate discrimination level. This not
only gives an optimal detection efficiency but also
enables protection by sensing the excess voltage
reduction through the residual capacitive back-
ground.
 Use different resistance values in a QKD system
that contains more than one detector. A careful
choice of resistance values can prevent an overlap
of the detectors’ blinding gaps, see Fig. 3, when
their discrimination levels are inadvertently ill-set.
 Verify whether the capacitive response residual can
overcome the detector discrimination level when
the APD’s reverse bias is lowered below its break-
down. If not, detune the self-differencing circuit
slightly and/or re-set the detector discrimination
level.
 Model the behaviour of the detector, as in Fig. 5, to
check that it behaves as expected in the protected
environment of a laboratory.
Compliance with the above criteria does not introduce
a significant increase in system complexity nor a reduc-
tion in the secure key rate. This is an advantage as com-
pared with the countermeasure of monitoring the detec-
tor efficiency [35], which offers a higher level of assurance
but at the expense of the system simplicity and key rate.
We note that the applicability of the proposed criteria
is not limited to SD detectors, but extendable to other
types of high-speed gated APD detectors, as discussed
earlier. They can all improve their resilience from the
negative feedback of the photocurrent, despite their use
of different signal cancellation techniques.
In summary, we have experimentally studied and the-
oretically modelled the behavior of an InGaAs self-
differencing detector under bright illumination from a
continuous-wave laser. We have shown that the intrinsic,
negative feedback of the photocurrent has prevented not
only an early blinding but also a complete blinding at
very high attacking powers by strengthening the residual
capacitive background. We have shown the importance
of setting an appropriate discrimination level as this has
a direct impact on the detector’s behavior under Eve’s
blinding attack. Our findings allow us to outline a set
of best-practice criteria to ensure the most secure condi-
tions to operate these detectors in QKD systems.
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